
NAGRA'S SAFETY CASE - SHAPED AND SUPPORTED BY DECADES OF RD&D

Prague, 26. November 2025






SUBMISSION OF THE GENERAL LICENSE APPLICATION 19TH NOVEMBER 2024





Radioactive Disposal in Switzerland

THE PROVISIONAL PROJECT AT NÖRDLICH LÄGERN




SAFETY CASE

nagra


DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY

In its 2014 brochure, NEA defines the "long-term safety case" for geological disposal of radioactive waste as "the synthesis of evidence, analyses and arguments to affirm that a repository will be radiologically safe without human intervention after repository closure."




THE WORKFLOW

The safety case workflow explains how requirements can be related to a provisional design that can be then assessed.



SAFETY& REPOSITORY CONCEPT

- Safety functions are the roles of the multi-barrier system that together ensure post-closure safety.
 - S1: Isolation of radioactive waste from the surface environment.
 - S2: Complete containment of radionuclides for a period of time.
 - S3: Immobilisation, retention, and slow release of radionuclides.
 - S4: Compatibility of the multi-barrier system elements and the radioactive waste types among each other and with other materials.
 - S5: Long-term stability of the multi-barrier system with respect to long-term geological and climatic processes.




01.12.2025

Performance assessment is the first step in the general safety assessment workflow.

Performance assessment (PA) foresees 4 steps:

- 1. PA by barrier
- 2. PA by total system
- 3. Uncertainty quantification
- 4. Performance screening

For auditability of the assessment workflow claims are formulated, assigning one or more intended safety functions to each component of the multi-barrier system and to the repository system as a whole.



CLAIMS, ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE

Claims are related to safety functions. Claims contribute to the demonstration that the long-term safety objectives and regulatory safety criteria can be robustly met for a repository at the proposed site:

- Isolation of radioactive waste from the surface environment
- Complete containment of radionuclides for a period of time (for HLW especially)
- Immobilisation retention and slow release of radionuclides
- Compatibility of the elements of the barrier system and radioactive waste with each other and with other materials
- Long-term stability of the barrier system with respect to long-term geological and climatic processes

Claims

Linked to safety functions



Arguments

- Adequate Design
- Favourable features / properties / conditions / evolutions



Evidence

- Empirical evidence / well-established knowledge base
- Dedicated experimental evidence
- Gained by model-supported quantitative assessments

LET'S WALK THROUGH AN EXAMPLE


		Arguments
Host rock	Radionuclides will be retained in the CRZ; any releases result in dose rates that are below the regulatory dose limit over the entire repository lifetime	The intact Opalinus Clay represents a diffusion dominated transport barrier with sufficient vertical and lateral extent
		The Opalinus Clay is well characterizable and exhibits low spatial variability of flow / transport properties
		Sorption is an additional retardation mechanism, contributing to the efficiency of the host rock as a transport barrier
		The transmissivity of faults in OPA and clay-rich sequences of the confining units is limited such that diffusion dominated transport is maintained in the geological barrier under a wide range of conditions
		The self-sealing capacity of the Opalinus Clay ensures re-sealing of activated fractures

LET'S WALK THROUGH AN EXAMPLE

What evidence support following argument?


The intact Opalinus Clay represents a diffusion dominated transport barrier with sufficient vertical and lateral extent

Strategy: multiple lines of evidence that are published and reviewed and of which the results are consistent are needed to support the argument



LET'S WALK THROUGH AN EXAMPLE

• Experiments can be terminated when the uncertainty they address has been reduced to a levels that is no longer relevant to safety



NL To Bound SF+RP-HLW+L/ILW Monte-Carlo Dissolved

CONCLUSIONS 1

The methodology developed for the demonstration of safety in the frame of the general license application allows to connect evidence from RD&D and claims from safety.

Well designed and dedicated experiments are key to performance assessment which is the first step in development of a safety case.

A logical framework relates experimental evidence with claims made for the safety case.




DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY: SOUND SCIENTIFIC BASIS

Quality and comprehensiven ess of the safety assessment

Part of the confidence building process:

Multiple lines of evidence




Pore size diameter, d [µm]

10-2


DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Favourable findings of the safety assessment How good is good enough? Indicators were used to assess the performance of the repository





DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY FOR EXPECTED EVOLUTION

Favourable findings of the safety assessment



EXPECTED, ALTERNATIVE AND HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SCENARIOS







18 01.12.2025 Autorenkürzel / Filename

CONCLUSIONS 2

The robustness of a claim is strengthened by seeking multiple lines of arguments

The performance assessment workflow encompasses four steps:

- Assessment of barrier performance at the component level "performance assessment by barrier"
- Assessment at the level of the entire system "total system performance"
- Uncertainty quantification focusing on parametric and conceptual uncertainties
- Performance screening (addressing scenario uncertainties), to screen the possible paths of repository performance and to identify, bundle and formulate safety scenario.



LONG-TERM PLANNING


The **stepwise approach** to realizing a geological repository:

• **Anchored in law:** Progress follows a legally mandated sequence — from conceptual studies to detailed design, from identifying siting regions to selecting sites, and from licenses to permits.

Monitoring phase


 Ensures steady and secure progress: A gradual approach enables careful evaluation at each stage, building confidence and protecting investments.

• Foundation for development and innovation: The stepwise process underpins project planning, implementation, and ongoing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D).



01.12.2025


MID-TERM PLANNING



DETAILED ROAD MAPS DRIVING REPOSITORY IMPLENTATION

Roadmaps:

- capture the work required to further develop Nagra's science and engineering base
- ensure that the technology, data and expertise
 necessary for optimising the concepts are acquired in a
 timely and cost-effective manner.




CONCLUSIONS 3

The reasons for carrying out RD&D and the drivers for identifying RD&D needs have evolved considerably.

In the early years, Nagra carried out exploratory RD&D on the basic scientific and technological options underlying the evolving geological disposal concept.

Today, RD&D focuses on contributing to the highly specific requirements arising from having an established repository conceptual design and safety case for a specific geological formation, and a specific regulatory framework.





WHEN DO WE HAVE TO KNOW WHAT AND AT WHAT DEGREE OF DETAIL?


2023

2025









CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FOR UNDERGROUND GEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

CONTINUED DIALOGUE & CO-OPERATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS

FURTHER OPTIMISATION IN PREPARATION FOR THE NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION LICENCE APPLICATIONS

CONTINUATION OF INTERNATIONAL & COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL (TRL)

ACTUAL SYSTEM PROVEN IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Deployment **Operational Licence(s)** SYSTEM COMPLETE AND QUALIFIED Repository site SYSTEM PROTOTYPE DEMONSTRATION IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Development TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATED IN RELEVANT ENVIRONMENT **Construction Licence(s)** TECHNOLOGY VALIDATED IN RELEVANT ENVIRONMENT EUU, Pilot repository at NL TECHNOLOGY VALIDATED IN THE LAB EXPERIMENTAL PROOF OF CONCEPT Research **General Licence TECHNOLOGY FORMULATED** Generic rock laboratories

BASIC PRINCIPLES OBSERVED

SAFETY CASE DOCUMENTATION

NTR 21-03

Thermodynamic Database


NAR 22-34

NTR 23-11

Degradation of Organics

NAR 24-29


Einfluss Betriebssicherheit



and Provisional Design

SAFETY CASE DOCUMENTATION





Safety and repository concept

NAB 24-18
Safety and Repository Concept and Provisional Design

Methodology	Databases	System evolution and performance		Geology
NTB 24-19 Safety Assessment Methodology	NTB 22-05 MIRAM-RBG	NAB 24-20 Storyboard	NAB 23-10 Radionuclide Release Model for Spent Fuel	NTB 24-17 Geosynthesis
NAB 20-31 Methodik Mindestabstand Kombilager	NTB 23-08 Diffusion Database	NAB 24-20 Supplementary Volume FEP Database	NAB 23-09 Aqueous Corrosion of Vitrified HLW	NAB 24-10 Geological Site Characterisation
NTB 23-04 Solubility Limits in Bentonite		NTB 23-02 Geochemical Evolution of the HLW Near Field	NTB 24-20 Design of Disposal Canisters	Design and operation
NAB 24-05 Abfallzuteilung und Betrachtungszeitraum	NTB 23-06 Sorption Database: Bentonite, Hostrock and Confining Units	NTB 23-03 Geochemical Evolution of the L/ILW Near Field	NTB 22-04 14C Speciation and Release from Radioactive Waste	NAB 23-01 Bautechnisches Dossier
NAB 23-28 Waste Group Classification L/ILW	NTB 23-07 Cement Sorption Database	NAB 23-21 Performance of Sealing System	NAB 23-22 Corrosion Rates	NTB 24-11 Anlage und Betrieb

