

IGD-TP Exchange Forum 5

Managing uncertainties


**Assessment Timescales and Complementary
Safety Arguments**

Kalmar, Sweden

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Two types of uncertainties

- Uncertainties generally increase with time and some events may lead to large increases in uncertainty
- UK guidance: “...an important distinction can be made between two types of uncertainties: those that can reliably be quantified and those that cannot”
- Will have very different approaches to treatment in a safety case and management
- Need complementary lines of argument



Safety assessment timescales

- **FEPs that could lead to changes in the characteristics of the main components of a disposal system**
 - FEPs that could give rise to significant increases in uncertainty; extent to which these are time-dependent
- **Three generic periods**
 1. **Near-field transient (re-saturation of near-field occurs)**
 2. **Disposal system stability**
 3. **Biosphere and geosphere evolution**
- **Length of (1) and (2) depends highly on disposal concept**
 - Different for different waste types in same host rock
- **Global cooling leads to increasing uncertainties in biosphere**
 - Glacial conditions cause significant hydrological changes

Probabilistic calculations

- Probabilistic calculations of dose and risk would be appropriate for the **disposal system stability** period
- Extension into the **near-field transient** period appropriate if there are releases of radionuclides to the geosphere
 - Requires reliable quantification of uncertainties relating to re-saturation
- Extension into the **biosphere and geosphere evolution** period appropriate if the uncertainties can be reliably quantified for a specific disposal concept and site

Constructing a safety case

- “Narrative” of disposal system evolution, supported by complementary safety arguments and calculations
- Timescales for probabilistic calculations

Indicative timescale	~ 100 years	~ 1,000 years	~ 10,000 years	~ 100,000 years
	Transient period		Disposal system stability	
			Biosphere and geosphere evolution	
	Decreasing uncertainty in system conditions →		Increasing uncertainty in system evolution →	
Narrative of disposal system evolution & complementary safety arguments				
<i>Reasoned arguments and comparisons with natural systems</i>				
<i>Deterministic, simple calculations & insight models</i>				
<i>Probabilistic calculations, uncertainty & sensitivity analysis followed by analysis of significant realisations</i>				RWM 2014

Complementary safety arguments

- **Deterministic and/or probabilistic PA calculations of dose and risk**
- **“Additional” safety arguments that complement those derived from PA calculations**
 - **Support safety case, especially at longer times**
 - **Wastes still present a hazard**
 - **Uncertainties increasingly large and difficult to quantify**

Categories of argument

- Arguments for the EBS / components thereof
- Arguments for the geological barrier
 - Period when the evolution of the EBS becomes increasingly uncertain (e.g. $>10^4$ - 10^5 years)
 - Geosphere is most important barrier ensuring continued isolation and containment
- Arguments for continuing safety
 - Period when large-scale geological processes, such as uplift, erosion and tectonics, may have significantly affected EBS / geosphere properties (e.g. $>10^5$ - 10^6 years)
- “Acceptable practices”
 - Consideration of hazard longevity and comparison to other industrial practices

Arguments for the EBS and geological barrier (<math><10^6\text{ y}</math>)


- **Continuing existence of favourable properties that ensure isolation and containment**
- **Potential impacts of climatic change can be understood**
 - **Deterministic sensitivity analyses based on understanding of the possible response of a specific disposal concept**
- **Calculate performance indicators for which site-specific reference values can be derived for naturally occurring radionuclides:**
 - **Release of activity to the biosphere or fluxes across planes**
 - **Radiotoxicity flux to the biosphere**
 - **Concentrations or total fluxes of radionuclides in ecosystems**
 - **Fluxes of safety-relevant radionuclides**
- **Consider naturally occurring radionuclides in evaluating potential for dissolution and re-precipitation of waste-derived radionuclides**
 - **U, Th and daughters**

Arguments for continuing safety ($>10^6$ y)

- **Reference to analogous natural systems**



- The evolution of uranium mineralisation near the site or in similar geological environments (e.g. Cigar Lake)
- Evidence from the geological history of the site and the surrounding region, or from similar geological environments
- Naturally occurring radionuclide concentrations and evidence for changes during similar kinds of disruptive event (e.g. glaciation – secondary minerals)

- **Compare impact of waste-derived radionuclides with naturally occurring counterparts**



Acceptable practices

- **Level of risk deemed acceptable as part of realising the benefits of related industries in a cost-effective manner**
 - Example: compare to impacts of NORM from other energy generation industries →
 - Example: discharges from nearby nuclear site →
- **What benefit would be derived from alternative disposal strategies... and what would the costs be?**
- **Disposal in that form, in that type of facility, at that site represents the “best” solution**
 - Nothing else can be done cost effectively to better ensure the safety of the environment in the far future



Achieving the IGD-TP vision 2025

Collaborative review/development work

1. **Assessment timescales** – influence on structure/type of calculations
 - *Key outcome: common understanding and framework*
 - *Key outcome: common consideration of scenarios at long timeframes*
2. **Complementary safety arguments** – structured approach / review
 - *Key outcome: catalogue of examples that programmes can use*
3. Compile / examine approaches to **uncertainty management**
 - *Key outcome: “uncertainty can be managed” – demonstration of how*
 - Uncertainties treated in assessment; wider uncertainties that provide bounds
 - Quantifiable and unquantifiable uncertainties; epistemic and aleatory; etc.
4. Compile / examine approaches to **presenting / discussing uncertainties**
 - *Key outcome: improved presentation of uncertainty in safety cases*
 - All significant uncertainties have been addressed; they do not jeopardise safety
 - Link to strategic choices on facility development
 - Link to forward programme